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This paper studies performance predictions in the 7-item Cognitive Reflection Test
(CRT) and whether they differ by gender. After participants completed the CRT, they
predicted their own (i), the other participants’ (ii), men’s (iii), and women’s (iv) number
of correct answers. In keeping with existing literature, men scored higher on the
CRT than women and both men and women were too optimistic about their own
performance. When we compare gender-specific predictions, we observe that men
think they perform significantly better than other men and do so significantly more than
women. The equality between women’s predictions about their own performance and
their female peers cannot be rejected. Our findings contribute to the growing literature
on the underpinnings of behavior in economics and in psychology by uncovering gender
differences in confidence about one’s ability relative to same and opposite sex peers.
Keywords: overconfidence, Cognitive Reflection Test, gender difference, performance prediction, competition,
intra-gender competition
INTRODUCTION
Confidence is an essential personality trait with a positive impact in numerous contexts, such
as subjective well-being (Taylor and Brown, 1988, 1994), professional success (Kanter, 2004),
or mental health (Taylor, 1989). Overconfidence, on the other hand, is a psychological bias by
definition, since it is an inaccurate judgment of one’s own abilities. Typical examples for this type
of bias are overly optimistic beliefs in one’s professional abilities (Meyer et al., 2013) or physical
fitness (Obling et al., 2015). This overly optimistic belief may be both absolute (i.e., individuals
predict that their performance is better than it actually is) or relative (i.e., individuals predict that
their performance is better than their peers’ when it actually is not). In the literature, the first type of
overconfidence is referred to as overestimation and the latter as overplacement (Moore and Healy,
2008).
Overconfident beliefs appear to have positive consequences in some contexts, while they can be
detrimental in others. Among other things, it has been suggested that overconfidence has positive
psychological benefits, for example, on ambition, morale, and persistence (Pajares, 1996; Johnson
and Fowler, 2011). Besides potential positive psychological benefits, overconfidence seems to help
individuals in a social setting by convincing others that they have better skills or knowledge than
they actually have (von Hippel and Trivers, 2011). Anderson et al. (2012) have shown empirically
that individuals with high levels of overconfidence are perceived as more competent by their peers.
This overstatement of one’s abilities could be an advantage in hiring decisions (Reuben et al., 2014).
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Besides potential positive aspects, several empirical studies
display the negative economic consequences of overconfidence.
Camerer and Lovallo (1999), for example, have found that
in a laboratory setting individuals tend to overestimate their
chances of relative success and therefore excessively enter a
competitive game. In a trading experiment, highly overconfident
investors show less reaction to bad news, which results
in lower profits for them compared to low overconfidence
investors (Trinugroho and Sembel, 2011). Similarly, Barber
and Odean (2001) have reported that overconfident investors
reduce their net earnings by excessive trading; i.e., the
expected gains from a trade do not exceed its transaction
costs. Moreover, managerial overconfidence seems to explain
investment distortion (Malmendier and Tate, 2005).
Despite the potential costs associated with overconfident
beliefs in some settings, overconfident judgments are an integral
part of various aspects of human decision making (De Bondt
and Thaler, 1995). They are common in many professional fields
such as investment banking (Stael von Holstein, 1972), economic
negotiations (Neale and Bazerman, 1991), the law (Wagenaar and
Keren, 1986), and even in clinical psychology (Oskamp, 1965).
One typically observed pattern is that while both men and women
are overconfident, men are more frequently prone to this bias
than women (Lichtenstein et al., 1982; Lundeberg et al., 1994)
and this seems to have important economic implications which
will be discussed in the next subsection.
Barber and Odean (2001), for instance, have investigated
the common stock investments of men and women separately.
They have shown that men trade 45% more than women and
this trading behavior actually reduces their earnings. They have
concluded that this is likely due to greater overconfidence in men.
Among other things, lower risk aversion in men can be attributed
to higher overconfidence (Soll and Klayman, 2004). Furthermore,
it has been shown in laboratory experiments that women are
less likely to enter competition than men and lower levels of
overconfidence are one explanation for this behavior (Niederle
and Vesterlund, 2007; Reuben et al., 2012). It seems that women
are disadvantaged in hiring decisions, because underconfident
women may not appear as competent as their male peers (Reuben
et al., 2014).
While the general tendency of men being more overconfident
than women has been reported in several studies, less is known
about the causes of this difference. This paper presents an
experimental assessment of the extent to which this bias is
driven by gender differences in confidence about one’s ability
relative to same and opposite sex peers. Thereby, the paper
extends the current literature (e.g., Dean and Ortoleva, 2015) on
overconfidence by using gender-specific questions. This appears
relevant from an economic perspective, as the composition of
one’s potential competitors is important for individual decisions
on whether to enter a competitive game (Datta Gupta et al., 2013).
Beliefs about one’s self and the others have been shown to be
important drivers for this decision (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999).
Similar findings have been reported in evolutionary biology. In
the course of human evolution, competition among men typically
took place as direct and aggressive contests. Competition among
women, by contrast, was typically more indirect and subtle
(Stockley and Campbell, 2013). One potential explanation for
these different types of behavior could be that the attractiveness
of direct intra-gender competition is different for men and
women, as they have different perceptions about their same-sex
peers. Recent studies have applied evolutionary theory to explain
decision-making patterns and this paper extends the literature to
overconfidence. For example, it has been hypothesized that men,
who face a higher sexual selection pressure than women (Trivers,
1972), should be more concerned about relative outcomes.
Women, by contrast, should be more concerned about absolute
outcomes, i.e., about resources for themselves and their offspring
(Buss, 1989; Ermer et al., 2008). Following the predictions
of this hypothesis, Schmidt et al. (2015) and Friedl et al.
(2016) have shown that social comparison has a greater effect
on men than on women in decision-making under risk and
ambiguity.
In order to study gender differences in confidence about one’s
ability relative to same and opposite sex peers, participants of
this study first solved the 7-item Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT).
Then they predicted their own (i), the other participants’ (ii),
men’s (iii), and women’s (iv) number of correct answers in this
task1. It was found that men perform better than women on
this particular task, a result that has been previously reported
(Kahneman and Frederick, 2002; Frederick, 2005). Moreover,
it was observed that both men and women overestimate their
performance; yet no significant gender effects in overestimation
were found. When gender-specific predictions were compared,
it emerged that men think they perform significantly better than
other men. The equality between women’s predictions about their
own performance and their female peers cannot be rejected.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Participants of the study were undergraduate students at Kiel
University (N = 131; 72 women; mean age = 24.7). The
experiment was organized and recruited with the software hroot
(Bock et al., 2014). The participants were randomly seated
in a classroom in groups of 15. They first read the general
instructions for the experiment themselves; then the instructions
were read out loud. After the protocol was completed, they
were invited to a separate room to get paid anonymously. The
protocol also included a short questionnaire on life satisfaction
questions and digit ratio measurement. Evidence obtained on the
relation between overconfidence scores and digit ratios from this
experiment is reported in Neyse et al. (2016).
7-item CRT
The 7-item CRT (Toplak et al., 2014) is an extended version
of the original 3-item CRT (Frederick, 2005) that includes
four additional questions. The CRT is designed to observe
participants’ ability to activate the Type 2 cognitive process
instead of giving intuitive and effortless answers through the
1Note that we use the word predict to refer to participants’ guesses throughout the
article, which should not be confused with the term prediction in econometrics.
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Type 1 cognitive process. According to the dual process theories
of cognition (Kahneman and Frederick, 2002), the Type 1
cognitive process yields to intuitive and automatic reasoning,
while the Type 2 process requires more thorough thinking and
conscientiousness. The first question of the CRT is as follows:
“A bat and a ball together cost $1.10. A bat costs $1 more than
a ball. How much does a ball cost?”
The intuitive, but incorrect, answer is 10 cents. The correct
answer is 5 cents.
Performance Predictions
Participants first received the 7-item CRT, which they had to
complete within 10 min. After 10 min, the answer sheets were
collected. This way, participants were prevented from making
any changes on the answer sheets, since their predictions were
also incentivized. Following the CRT, they were given another
sheet on which they were asked to predict their own number
of correct answers (i), the average number of correct answers
of other participants in their group (ii), the men in their group
(iii), and the women in their group (iv). For each correct answer
in the CRT, the participants were paid €0.5. Correct predictions
about their own score and others’ scores were rewarded with €2
and false predictions with nothing. Gender-specific predictions
were not incentivized2. The prediction task was not announced
beforehand in order to avoid strategic behavior in answering the
7-item CRT itself. Participants used pen and paper to answer both
the CRT-questions and the prediction task. Instructions for the
experiment can be found in the Supplementary Material.
Ethics Statement
All participants of the experiment were informed about the
content and the protocol of the study before participation.
Their anonymity was preserved by assigning them a randomly
generated code that cannot be associated with any personal
information or decision. As is standard in economics
experiments, no ethical concerns were involved other than
preserving the anonymity of the participants. The whole protocol
was performed in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki
and conformed to the ethical guidelines of the Kiel University
Experimental Economics Lab, where it was approved by the lab
manager.
RESULTS
Summary Statistics
Figure 1 presents the means of actual scores and predictions
by gender. The participants scored 4.44 (SD = 1.836) correct
answers on average regardless of gender3. Mean number of
2Since the gender information was gathered in a different sheet of paper at the end
of the protocol and due to time constraints, we did not incentivize the gender-
specific predictions. A two-sample variance comparison test did not reject the null
hypothesis that the prediction variance is equal for unincentivized and incentivized
predictions for both men and women at the 5% significance level.
3If we consider only the first three items as in Frederick (2005), the average
number of correct answers is 1.76 (SD = 1.068). In contrast to previous studies
(Brañas–Garza et al., 2015; Cueva et al., 2016), the number of participants who
correct answers for men is 4.98 (SD = 1.892) and for women
4.00 (SD = 1.914). A two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test
confirms that the average score of men is significantly higher
than of women (z = −2.847, p = 0.004). This is in line with
previous findings in the literature (Kahneman and Frederick,
2002; Frederick, 2005; Cueva et al., 2016).
Participants predicted that they themselves had answered 5.72
(SD= 1.416) questions correctly on average. Men predicted their
own scores as 6.24 (SD = 1.165), while women predicted their
own scores as 5.29 (SD = 0.173). A Wilcoxon rank-sum test
confirms that this gender difference is significant (z = −4.144,
p < 0.001).
The overall predictions about the other participants’ number
of correct answers is 5.12 (SD = 0.966) on average. Men’s
mean prediction is 5.22 (SD = 1.115), while women’s is 5.03
(SD = 0.822). The two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test does
not reject the null hypothesis of no difference (z = −1.564,
p= 0.118).
In addition to predictions about their own and other
participants’ performance, participants were also asked to predict
the average scores of men and women in their group separately.
The prediction about men’s mean scores is 4.89 (SD= 1.109) and
about women’s is 5.47 (SD = 0.998) for the whole sample. Men’s
prediction about other men is 5.08 (SD = 1.204) and women’s
prediction about men is 4.74 (SD = 1.007). The difference is
statistically significant (z = −2.129, p = 0.033). Men predicted
women’s score as 5.38 (SD = 1.117) and women’s average
prediction about women was 5.55 (SD= 0.885). Non-parametric
analysis does not confirm a statistically significant difference
(z = 0.400, p= 0.690)4.
Table 1 presents the comparison analysis of predictions. All
results are gathered with Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. p-values
are given for all participants as well as for men and women
separately. Inequality signs to the right of each p-value indicate
whether the value of the difference between the two predictions
in the first column is positive, zero, or negative. Differences
in means are not reported in Table 1 as they are available
in Figure 1. The first row shows that both men and women
overestimate their scores. Their predictions about their own
scores are significantly higher than their actual scores (p< 0.001).
This result is a clear indication of overestimation, which is
the difference between one’s actual score and prediction. The
second row shows that both men and women predicted that
they would do better than other participants (p < 0.001 for
men and p = 0.050 for women). This result is an indication
of overplacement. Gender-specific predictions indicate that both
men and women thought they did better than men (p < 0.001
for both). Yet, only men thought they did better than women
(p < 0.001 for men and p = 0.104 for women). Finally gender-
specific predictions are compared with each other. Row 5 shows
that both men and women thought women would do better
answered none of the questions correctly was rather low in our experiment. See
Supplementary Figures A1 and A2 for histograms on the distribution of correct
answers.
4Since there was no interaction between participants and since the performance
of participants was not disclosed, group behavior cannot affect the individual
behavior. Therefore, no possible reflection problem is anticipated (Manski, 1993).
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FIGURE 1 | Average scores and predictions by gender.
TABLE 1 | Comparisons of actual performance and predictions about others.
All Men Women
Self vs actual score p< 0.001 > p< 0.001 > p< 0.001 >
Comparisons of predictions
Self vs others p< 0.001 > p< 0.001 > p= 0.050 >
Self vs men p< 0.001 > p< 0.001 > p< 0.001 >
Self vs women p= 0.023 > p< 0.001 > p= 0.104 –
Men vs women p< 0.001 < p= 0.004 < p< 0.001 <
Self, others, men, and women denote predictions whereas actual score does not.
than men on the task (p < 0.001 for women and p = 0.004 for
men).
Gender-Specific Differences in
Performance Predictions
The main research questions are whether there are gender-
specific differences in overestimation and overplacement scores
and whether such gender-specific differences can be related to
participants’ gender biases about other participants’ performance.
In order to answer them, four different variables based on
participants’ predictions and their actual performance were
generated (Table 2).
Overestimation is the difference between one’s self-prediction
and actual score, and overplacement is the difference between
one’s self-prediction and the prediction about others regardless
of gender. According to Moore and Healy (2008) overestimation
and overplacement are two aspects of overconfidence5. The intra-
gender overplacement variable detects how much better or worse
one thinks she/he is than the other participants with the same
gender. Likewise, the inter-gender overplacement variable shows
how much better or worse one thinks she/he is than participants
of the other gender.
Both men and women in our sample overestimated their own
scores (Figure 2). The average overestimation score for men is
1.25 (SD= 1.409) and for women 1.29 (SD= 1.542). A Wilcoxon
rank-sum test does not detect any statistically significant gender
difference in overestimation scores (z = 0.053, p = 0.958).
Yet, men tend to overplace themselves significantly more than
women (z = −3.737, p < 0.001). The average overplacement
score is 1.02 (SD = 1.025) for men and 0.26 (SD = 1.138) for
5The third aspect is excessive precision, yet we only focus on the first two in the
current study.
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TABLE 2 | Generated overestimation and overplacement variables.
Min Max
Overestimation Actual score – Prediction about one’s performance −2 6
Overplacement Prediction about one’s performance – Prediction about the others’ performance (all) −2 5
Intra-gender overplacement Prediction about one’s performance – Prediction about the others’ performance (own gender) −3 5
Inter-gender overplacement Prediction about one’s performance – Prediction about the others’ performance (other gender) −2 5
Min (max) is the smallest (largest) value of the respective variable in our data-set.
FIGURE 2 | Average overestimation and overplacement scores.
women. Intra-gender overplacement is significantly higher in
men than women (z = −5.942, p < 0.001). Men’s average intra-
gender overplacement score is 1.16 (SD = 1.142) and women’s
is −0.26 (SD = 1.303). However, significant gender differences
in inter-gender overplacement were not observed (z = −1.155,
p = 0.248). The inter-gender overplacement scores are 0.86
(SD= 1.058) for men and 0.56 (SD= 1.047) for women.
In a nutshell, we observe that men think they perform
significantly better than other men and do so significantly more
than women. The equality between women’s predictions about
their own performance and their female peers, however, cannot
be rejected.
DISCUSSION
The main outcome of the study is that men think that they would
perform significantly better on the 7-item CRT than their male
peers, while women made comparable predictions about their
own performance and their female peers. This gender-specific
overplacement variable is significantly different between men
and women with men overplacing their performance more than
women.
A large body of literature in economics and psychology
suggests that women, on average, are less confident and
competitive than men (see Croson and Gneezy, 2009 for an
overview). We contribute to this literature by uncovering
gender differences in confidence about one’s performance
relative to same and opposite sex peers. Previous research
has indicated that social components in a choice situation
have an impact on gender differences in confidence and
competitive behavior. On the one hand, it has been shown
that women are more confident in their group’s performance
than in their own performance, while men are less confident
in their group’s performance compared to their own (Healy
and Pate, 2007). While this study indicates that predictions
about one’s own and other’s performance might differ by
gender in certain situations, it does not specifically assess
whether differences in performance are due to gender
distribution within the reference group. Therefore, it is not
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directly comparable to the present study, where each participant
was specifically asked about her/his prediction about men’s and
women’s performance separately. On the other hand, it has been
shown that men’s decision to enter a tournament or a piece-rate
pay scheme can depend on the co-participant’s gender (Datta
Gupta et al., 2013). In that study, men competed less against
other men than against women, when the gender information
was made sufficiently salient. While this result appears to be
out of line with our findings, which might be due to the task
type or the transition from beliefs to actions, it shows that
competitive behavior might have intra- and inter-gender-specific
components. This is a finding that is also often reported in the
context of evolutionary-biology, which we refer to in the next part
of the discussion.
In the course of human evolution, competition among
males typically took place as direct and aggressive contests.
Competition among females, by contrast, often occurred more
indirectly and subtly. One potential explanation for these
different types of behavior could be that the attractiveness of
direct intra-gender competition is different for men and women,
as they have different perceptions about their same-sex peers.
It may be suggested that confidence in one’s own abilities
relative to one’s competitors is an important drive underlying
this observation. The link between beliefs about relative skill
and the decision to enter competition has been established by
several economics experiments (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999).
If men think that they perform better than their peers (other
men), it potentially makes direct competitions attractive for
them. If women, by contrast, think that their peers (other
women) perform similarly to them, direct competition appears
less attractive and competition might take place on a more subtle
level.
It appears important, however, to stress the possibility of
reversed causality. It might be that evolutionary differences in
competitiveness as an attitude may affect confidence beliefs due
to self-enhancement. Self-enhancement refers to the fact that
individuals gain positive utility by comparing themselves with
lower ranked peers (Wood and Taylor, 1991). In particular, due
to evolutionary differences between the levels of male and female
competitiveness, confidence beliefs may give them different
utility levels. Falk and Knell (2004) developed a social comparison
model that includes self-enhancement and self-improvement in
the utility function. The model shows that people with higher
abilities tend to compare themselves with people who also have
high abilities. They also show that women have lower reference
standards. This finding is in line with our results showing that
women over-place themselves less than men.
Some words of caution are in order. First, this study is
on predictions about others relative to one’s performance. In
future studies whether the above outlined causal chain from
beliefs about performance translates into actual competitive
behavior should be addressed. Second, performance predictions
for the CRT were studied. This is a special task that aims
on impulsiveness of decision-making and to what extent
our findings apply in a broader context deserves further
investigation.6 Dreber et al. (2014), for example, have shown
that the type of task matters with respect to gender differences
in competitive behavior. Third, confidence and competition are
social notions that develop via countless interactions in distinct
contexts. Due to its specific research questions, the design of the
current study does not involve any social interaction between
participants. Yet, it may be the case that overconfident behavior
can alter with human interaction or social motives. For example,
Burks et al. (2013) have shown that overconfidence can be
induced by the desire to send positive signals to others about
one’s own skill. Therefore, attention needs to be paid to the role
of social interaction and motives on overconfidence in future
studies.
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